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Our paper extends the capital tax competition literature by incorporating heterogeneous 
capital and agglomeration. Our model nests the standard tax competition model as well as the 
special case in which there is agglomeration but no firm/capital heterogeneity and the 
opposite case, firm heterogeneity with no agglomeration. We build on the existing tax 
competition literature as well as establish a link between this literature and the more recent 
work on agglomeration using the new economic geography model. Our main contribution lies 
in allowing for firm heterogeneity which we show plays a role similar to decreasing returns in 
regional production. 
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The ﬂurry of federation formation and dissolution around the world over the past
ﬁfty years has inspired sub-literatures in both international trade and public ﬁ-
nance. The ability of any coalition formation model to explain the complex facts
of economic history is limited by its underlying model of interregional competition
(e.g., tariﬀ wars or tax competition). One such model of interregional competi-
tion has served as the basis for the capital tax competition literature surveyed by
Wilson (1999). Here each regional government possesses a single tax instrument
– a proportional capital tax rate – to ﬁnance a publicly provided private good.
Interregional tax competition leads to capital tax rates below socially optimal
levels and consequently underprovision of the publicly provided private good. In
this model larger regions are at a disadvantage because they perceive a more
inelastic supply of capital than smaller regions, and as a consequence set a rela-
tively high capital tax rate, export capital when eﬃciency would dictate no trade
in capital, and suﬀer a lower utility level than smaller regions. Baldwin and
Krugman (2004) and Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano, and Robert-Nicoud
(2003) label this the basic tax competition model (BTCM) and note several ways
in which this model is inconsistent with observations based on the history of fed-
eration formation in Europe. In this paper, we incorporate agglomeration and
ﬁrm heterogeneity into an even simpler BTCM and show that our model can be
consistent with the European Union facts highlighted by Baldwin and Krugman
(2004).
The roots of the capital tax competition model in the present paper are like
those of the BTCM except that each government can tax immobile labour as
well as mobile capital. This eliminates the underprovision problem and leaves
each government free to set its capital tax or subsidy rate to exploit its monopoly
or monopsony power in the market for capital (see Hamada (1966) or Burbidge,
DePater, Myers, and Sengupta (1997)). We build heterogeneous capital into
the model by assuming each ﬁrm has productivity factors that determine how
productive it will be in a given region and each ﬁrm locates where its proﬁts are
highest. Except for the marginal ﬁrm that is indiﬀerent between locating in one
region or the other, the ﬁr m si ne a c hr e g i o ne a r nr e n t s . 1
Regions compete for ﬁrms.2 Regional governments know the joint distribution
of productivity factors but they cannot condition ﬁrm taxes or subsidies on the
productivity or proﬁtability of a given ﬁrm – a common proportional tax rate
applies to all ﬁrms operating in its region.3 To incorporate agglomeration into the
1Positive rent diﬀerentials across regions arise whenever there is heterogenity in the mobile
factor. See Mansoorian and Myers (1993) for a model with mobile workers who diﬀer in their
preferences or their attachment to home.
2Other tax competition models with mobile ﬁrms can be found in Boadway, Cuﬀ,a n d
Marceau (2004) and Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002).
3Many regions tax some ﬁrms and subsidize others. We think the model in this paper
1model, we assume a ﬁrm’s output depends positively on the total output in the
region. With constant returns to scale and homogeneous capital/ﬁrms capital-
importing regions tax capital to drive down the after-tax price they must pay for
their imports and capital-exporting regions subsidize capital to encourage capital
to stay at home, which raises the return they receive on their capital exports.
We demonstrate that the addition of increasing returns to scale and capital/ﬁrm
heterogeneity does not alter fundamentally the character of this model – now if
a region is a capital/ﬁrm importer its tax rate must exceed the other region’s tax
rate – but the tax rates could be of either sign and thus the model is consistent
with a broader set of facts.
We present the model of the regional economy in the next section. In sec-
tion 3, we characterize the regional equilibrium without tax competition and
demonstrate that with Cobb-Douglas production functions the regional equilib-
rium is always eﬃcient. We describe the tax competition game and characterize
its Nash equilibria in section 4. We show that the Nash equilibrium will be
eﬃcient when regions are identical. We also demonstrate that agglomeration en-
courages a region to subsidize ﬁrms to correct for the positive externality, while
ﬁrm heterogeneity induces a region to tax ﬁrms to capture location-speciﬁcr e n t s .
When regional endowments diﬀer, the Nash equilibrium may be ineﬃcient since
each region has an incentive to manipulate the terms-of-trade. We illustrate this
incentive by conducting a particular comparative static exercise – increasing one
region’s labour and ﬁrm/capital endowment proportionately, starting from sym-
metry. We show that the large region can either import or export and have either
a higher or lower level of welfare depending on the relative strength of the two
forces at work in the model — heterogeneity of ﬁrms and agglomeration. We prove
that, in general, the region importing (exporting) ﬁrms will have a higher (lower)
tax in any Nash equilibrium. We then show that some forms of tax harmoniza-
tion can be Pareto improving. In section 5, we compare and contrast our results
to those found in the economic geography literature. Section 6 summarizes and
concludes.
2 Regional Economy
The economy consists of two regions, denoted A and B. There are Hi workers in
region i (where i is either A or B). The workers are immobile, and each worker
supplies one unit of labour at every wage rate. The total number of ﬁrms in the
economy is ﬁxed. Firms are assumed to be completely owned by workers in the
economy. Workers in region i own a fraction γi of each ﬁrm in the economy where
γA + γB =1 .
could be extended to incorporate this feature of reality. See Taylor (2003) for an industrial
organization model that explains why publishers oﬀer lower prices for magazine subscriptions
to attract new customers.
2Each ﬁrm knows its productivity and the wage rates in each region. Given
this information, a ﬁrm chooses its location and its employment of labour so as
to maximize its proﬁts. The productivity of any given ﬁrm in a given region is
determined in part by its productivity factors (θA,θB). The distribution of
productivity factors across ﬁrms is described by the density function g(θA,θB),
w h i c hh a sl o w e ra n du p p e rb o u n d s .
Avvxpswlrq: Let S be the set of pairs (θA,θB) for which g(θA,θB)
is positive. Assume that there exists a positive number θ such that
(θ,θ) is a lower bound of S, and that there exists a positive ﬁnite
number θ such that (θ,θ) is an upper bound of S.
A ﬁrm’s productivity is also aﬀected by agglomeration; each ﬁrm beneﬁts from
the presence of other ﬁrms in the region. It might be that a greater concentration
of ﬁrms makes each ﬁrm more productive because transportation costs are lower
or opportunities to trade more plentiful. Alternatively, it might be easier to learn
about state-of-the-art production technologies when ﬁrms cluster together. The
exact nature of the agglomeration eﬀe c ti sl e f tu n s p e c i ﬁed. Instead, it is simply
assumed that each ﬁrm’s output is greater when economic activity in its region
is greater.
Let yi be a ﬁrm’s output in region i,a n dl e th be the quantity of labour
employed by the ﬁrm. Let Yi be regional output. Each ﬁrm’s production function
is




where the parameters α and β are positive and smaller than one. This produc-
tion function incorporates the basic assumptions: the ﬁrm’s output rises with its
own productivity factor, and both regional output and employment have posi-
tive but diminishing marginal products. The Cobb-Douglas function is used for
tractability.
3 Regional Equilibrium
To begin, deﬁne the equilibrium in the regional economy as follows:
Dhilqlwlrq: A regional equilibrium has these properties:
(a) Each ﬁrm, knowing the regional outputs and wage rates, chooses
a location (either region A or region B) and a level of employment to
maximize its proﬁts.
(b) The wage rate wi clears the labour market in region i.
(c) Regional output is the aggregate of the outputs of the individual
ﬁrms.
33.1 Employment and Location Decisions
A ﬁrm that has decided to locate in region i can hire any quantity of labour at
t h em a r k e tw a g ewi. It will choose the quantity of labour h that maximizes its
proﬁts πi,w h e r e




This quantity of labour is:





Evaluating the ﬁrm’s output and proﬁts at this employment level gives






πi =( 1− β)yi. (3)





A ﬁrm’s output in each region depends upon its productivity factor in that region
and on the regional output and wage rate. Consequently, a ﬁrm will locate in










and it will locate in region B otherwise. This decision rule is the one required by
part (a) of the deﬁnition of equilibrium. The employment rule required by the
same part is (1).
3.2 Regional Labour Markets
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4where zi(k) aggregates the productivity factors of the ﬁr m st h a tl o c a t ei nr e g i o n


















B(k) ≤ 0. (5)
If an increase in the critical value k causes some ﬁrms that had previously located
in A to shift to B, zA falls and zB rises. Each of the ﬁrms that switches from one
region to the other is a marginal ﬁrm at the time of the switch, implying that θA
is just equal to kθB. The loss in region A’s aggregate productivity is therefore k
times as large as region B’s gain.4
Part (b) of the deﬁnition of equilibrium requires labour demand to be equal





1−β zi(k)=Hi i = A,B (6)
3.3 Regional Output
Part (c) of the deﬁnition of equilibrium states that the output of a region can be
found by integrating over the outputs of the individual ﬁrms. There is, however,
as i m p l e rw a yo fﬁnding it. Since each ﬁrm’s proﬁts are fraction 1 − β of its
output, each ﬁrm’s wage bill is fraction β of its output. The regional outputs
therefore satisfy the conditions
Yi =( 1 /β)wiHi i = A,B (7)
3.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of the following information:
• The location, output and employment of each ﬁrm.
• The market-clearing wage in each region.
• The output of each region.
4The inequality in (5) is weak because z3
i(k) is equal to zero at any k for which there are no
pairs (θA,θB) in S such that θA is equal to θBk (so that a small change in k does not induce
any ﬁrm to switch regions).
5N o t e ,h o w e v e r ,t h a ti ft h ev a l u e so fk, YA, YB, wA,a n dwB are known, all of the
remaining information can be deduced from them. The location of each ﬁrm is
determined by k. Once the location of a ﬁrm is known, its employment of labour
and its output are given by (1) and (2). The only arguments in these equations
are YA, YB, wA and wB.
The ﬁve key variables are themselves determined by the ﬁve equation system
consisting of (4), the two equations in (6), and the two equations in (7). This
system can be considerably simpliﬁed. Use the last four equations (in pairs) to















1−α i = A,B (9)
Output rises as the supply of labour rises and as the aggregate productivity of
the ﬁrms in the region rises. The wage rises as the aggregate productivity of the
ﬁrms rises, but might either rise or fall as the supply of labour rises. The latter
result follows from the presence of agglomeration. Suppose that the supply of
labour rises and that the wage adjusts to absorb all of the additional labour. The
marginal product of labour at each ﬁrm falls because more labour is being used;
but it rises because every ﬁrm is using more labour and producing more output,
causing regional output to rise. The wage rate falls if the former eﬀect dominates,
and rises if the latter eﬀect dominates.


























It follows from (10) that the equilibrium location of ﬁrms and consequently,
the regional outputs and wage rates in equilibrium are all independent of the
distribution of ﬁrm ownership in the economy. Firm ownership aﬀects only the
resources available to each region in equilibrium. To interpret (10), imagine that
the ﬁrms initially allocate themselves between the two regions according to the
rule:
6Locate in A if θA i sg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt okθB;o t h e r w i s e ,l o c a t ei nB.
For any given value of k,aﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts by locating in A if θA is
greater than or equal to Lµ(k)θB and by locating in B if it is not. The equilibrium
value of k is the one under which no ﬁrm regrets its location because the proﬁt-
maximizing critical value, Lµ(k), is equal to the current critical value, k.5
If Lµ(k) is greater than k,s o m eo ft h eﬁrms that are initially located in A will
move to B,c a u s i n gk to rise; and if Lµ(k) is smaller than k,s o m eo ft h eﬁrms
that are initially located in B will move to A,c a u s i n gk to fall. This observation
motivates the following deﬁnition:
Dhilqlwlrq: Let k∗ be the value taken by k in an equilibrium. The
equilibrium is stable if Lµ(k) is greater than k when k is less than
k∗, and less than k when k is greater than k∗. It is unstable if Lµ(k)
is less than k when k is less than k∗, and greater than k when k is
greater than k∗.
Equation (8) shows that in any equilibrium, each region’s output is determined
by k. Since the total output of the economy is the sum of the regional outputs, it
is also determined by k. Diﬀerentiating YA+YB with respect to k and simplifying






= sign[ Lµ(k) − k].
Let ke be a stationary point of YA+YB. The stationary point is a local maximum
if Lµ(k) is greater than k when k is less than ke, and less than k when k is greater
than ke. It is a local minimum if Lµ(k) is less than k when k is less than ke, and
greater than k when k is greater than ke.
Comparing these results with the above deﬁnition leads immediately to the
following observation:
Lhppd 1: Let k∗ be the value taken by k in a unique equilibrium.
Then k∗ maximizes total output if and only if the economy is stable,
and it minimizes total output if and only if the economy is unstable.
If the economy is stable, the regional equilibrium without tax competition will be
output-maximizing. It is shown below that economies with strong agglomeration
eﬀects are not stable and total output will be maximized only when all ﬁrms
locate in the same region.
5Actually, (10) describes only an interior equilibrium. Suppose that all of the mobile ﬁrms
locate in A when k is equal to k3, and that all of the mobile ﬁrms locate in B when k is equal
to k33. Then k3 is an equilibrium if Lµ(k3) is less than k3,a n dk33 is an equilibrium if Lµ(k33) is
greater than k33. This kind of equilibrium arises only when the interior equilibrium is unstable,
and situations that give rise to unstable interior equilibria are largely ignored in the discussion
that follows.
73.5 Symmetric Regions
Regions are symmetric if they have the same labour supplies and own an equal
share of all ﬁrms in the economy, and if the frequency distribution of the produc-







   ∈ S.
With symmetric regions, the equilibrium value of k is characterized by:
k = µ(k).
If β is greater than α, µ(k) is non-increasing in k (speciﬁcally, it is negatively
sloped if the z 
i are non-zero and ﬂat if they are equal to zero). This case is shown
in Figure 1. The graphs of µ(k) and k are shown for all values of k between k
and k,w h e r e :
k ≡ θ/θ < 1








Since µ(k) is continuous and non-increasing, the graphs of µ(k) and k intersect
exactly once between k and k. With symmetry of the frequency distribution
zA(1/k)=zB(k)
and the equilibrium value of k is 1. This equilibrium is unique and stable, and
by Lemma 1, maximizes the economy’s total output. Every ﬁrm locates in the
region in which it has the higher productivity factor θi.
Figure 2 assumes that α is greater than β.T h e f u n c t i o n µ(k) is now non-
decreasing in k. Since
0=µ(k) <k< 1 < k<µ (k)=∞
there is at least one equilibrium, and multiple equilibria are possible. In this
case, the symmetric equilibrium is unstable and by Lemma 1, minimizes total
output. If the equilibrium is unique, total output is maximized when all of the
ﬁrms locate in one region.6 As an equilibrium with these properties is not very
interesting, it is assumed henceforth that β is greater than α.
6If all of the ﬁrms locate in one region, some of them are choosing to locate in that region
even though their productivity factor in that region is lower–possibly substantially lower–
than their productivity factor in the other region. They do so because the agglomeration eﬀect
caused by concentrating all of the ﬁrms in one region more than compensates them for choosing
the region in which their productivity factor is lower.
8Figure 1: The equilibrium value of k when β is greater than α.
When k is equal to k,e v e r y￿rm goes to A, implying:
µ(k)=∞
Similarly, when k is equal to k,e v e r y￿rm goes to B, implying:
µ(k)=0
Since µ(k) is continuous and non-increasing, the graphs of µ(k) and k intersect exactly
once between k and k. As noted above, that intersection occurs when k is equal to 1. This
equilibrium is unique and stable, and it maximizes the economy￿s total output. Every ￿rm
locates in the region in which it has the higher productivity factor θi.
Figure 2 assumes that α is greater than β. The function µ(k) is now non-decreasing in
k. Since
0=µ(k) <k< 1 < k<µ (k)=∞
there is at least one equilibrium, and multiple equilibria are possible. In this case, the
symmetric equilibrium is unstable and minimizes total output. If the equilibrium is unique,
total output is maximized when all of the ￿rms locate in one region.3 As an equilibrium
3 If all of the mobile ￿rms locate in one region, some of them are choosing to locate in that region even
9Figure 2: A unique equilibrium when α is greater than β.
with these properties is not very interesting, it is assumed henceforth that β is greater than
α.
3 Tax Competition
Assume that the workers in region i own the fraction γi of each ￿rm, and that
γA + γB =1
Let the utility of a worker in region i be
Ui = u(Gi,c i)
where Gi is the quantity of some private good provided to each worker by the government,
and ci is the worker￿s consumption of another private good. The government can impose
though their productivity factors in that region is lower￿possibly substantially lower￿than their pro-
ductivity factors in the other region. They do so because the agglomeration effect caused by concen-
tratingall of the ￿rms in one region more than compensates themfor choosing the regionin which their pro-
ductivity factor is lower.
103.6 Asymmetric Regions
Now, assume that both the distribution of labour supplies and of ﬁrm ownership,
and the frequency distribution of the θs are all asymmetric. In this case, the
equilibrium value of k in the economy is determined from:
k = Lµ(k).
With β greater than α, the equilibrium is unique and stable, and by Lemma
1 maximizes the economy’s total output. The equilibrium value of k,h o w e v e r ,
will depend on the distribution of labour in the economy.7 For example, if the
frequency distribution of the productivity factors happened to be symmetric, then
k will be greater, or less than, unity depending on whether region A has fewer,
or more, workers than region B. In this case, it is output-maximizing for some
ﬁrms to locate in a region for which they have a lower productivity factor.
4 Tax Competition
Now suppose each region has a government. The government of region i taxes
both workers’ incomes and ﬁrms’ proﬁts – not necessarily at the same rate –
and uses the revenue to provide a private good to the workers in its region.8 We
assume it takes one unit of the private good to produce one unit of the publicly
provided private good. Governments ﬁrst select their tax and spending policies
a n dt h e ne a c hﬁrm knowing its own regional productivities as well as the regional
wage and tax rates, chooses a location and a level of employment to maximize
its after-tax proﬁts.
The regional proportional tax on proﬁts, denoted ti, will not aﬀect the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt-maximizing level of employment, so before-tax proﬁts are still a constant
proportion of the ﬁrm’s output as described by (3). Consequently for a given
value of k, the equilibrium regional outputs and wages are still given by (8) and
(9). The proﬁt tax does, however, aﬀect a ﬁrm’s location decision. A ﬁrm will
locate in region A if
(1 − tA)yA ≥ (1 − tB)yB.
Using (2), (8), and (9), the critical value of k in equilibrium is now determined
by





7One can think about the downward sloping line in Figure 1 pivoting around the point (0,k).
It pivots to the left when L<1 and to the right when L>1.
8We implicitly rule out the possibility of transfer pricing by assuming the government can
observe where a ﬁrm produces and the proﬁti te a r n s .
9Let kn be the value of k in an equilibrium with tax competition. By deﬁnition,
the equilibrium is stable if TLµ(k) is greater than k when k is less than kn, and
less than k when k is greater than kn. From Lemma 1, the economy’s total output
is maximized only if the equilibrium is stable, and if tax rates are the same across























An increase in a region’s tax rate reduces the measure of ﬁrms in that region.
The regional equilibrium for a given pair of tax rates is described by (11). The
next step is to determine what tax rates the regional governments will choose to
maximize the welfare of their workers.
We assume preferences of a worker in region i can be represented by the
following well-behaved utility function
Ui = u(ci,gi)
where ci is the worker’s consumption of some private good, and gi is the quantity
of a publicly provided private good. A worker has two sources of income: wage
earnings and returns to ﬁrm ownership.9 The government can impose a tax
on the workers’ incomes, and since labour is immobile and a worker’s share of
ﬁrm ownership is given, this tax is lump-sum. The income tax revenue can be
combined with the revenue from the tax on proﬁts to ﬁnance the publicly provided
private good, or the income tax revenue could be split between the provision of
the government good and the subsidization of the ﬁrms. (This subsidization
would take the form of a negative proportional tax on proﬁts.) In either case,





where Ri are the total resources available to residents of region i. Each worker
in region i is allowed to retain a part of his income ci as his private consumption,
and the remainder of the region’s resources are allocated to the government good.
9As workers are identical within a given region, we assume each worker in region i owns a
share γi/Hi of each ﬁrm in the economy. So, each worker recieves a share of the after-tax proﬁts
from every ﬁrm in the economy. Therefore, all workers want every ﬁrm to locate in whichever
region the ﬁrm can earn the highest after-tax proﬁts. Allowing workers in each region to own
diﬀerent shares of the ﬁrms in the economy would complicate the model considerably.
10The government in region i chooses a lump-sum tax, or equivalently private




and there is eﬃcient provision of the publicly provided private good. Therefore,















Clearly, the government can maximize the worker’s utility by choosing ti to
maximize its resources Ri since workers are immobile. The resources of the two
regions can be written as
RA = YA +( 1− β)[γA(1 − tB)YB − γB(1 − tA)YA] (13)
RB = YB − (1 − β)[γA(1 − tB)YB − γB(1 − tA)YA]. (14)
The resources available to region A include all of its own output except for region
B’s share of region A’s after-tax proﬁts, plus region A’s share of region B’s after-
tax proﬁts. The resources of region B are calculated in a similar fashion.
Regional governments act non-cooperatively and choose their own proﬁtt a x
rate taking as given the other region’s tax rate. We can now deﬁne the tax
competition game.
Dhilqlwlrq: The tax competition game has these characteristics:
(a) The players are the two governments, A and B.
(b) Government i (where i is either A or B)c h o o s e st h et a xr a t eti;
the tax rate must be smaller than unity, but it can be either positive
or negative.
(c) The governments recognize that, for any pair of tax rates they
choose, the economy will reach an equilibrium as described by (8),
(9), and (11). Hence, each government recognizes that the output of
i t so w nr e g i o nd e p e n d su p o nb o t hp r o ﬁt tax rates.
(d) Each government i wishes to maximize Ri.
A Nash equilibrium in the tax competition game is a pair (tA,t B) such that
neither government can increase its own resources by unilaterally deviating from
the equilibrium.
Region A’s best tax rate is the solution to the problem:
max
tA
RA = h YA(T)+( 1− β)[γA(1 − tB)h YB(T) − γB(1 − tA)h YA(T)]
11where h Yi(T) is region i’s output under an equilibrium with k given by (11). The
ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum is
γB(1−β)h YA +
+
[1 − γB(1 − β)(1 − tA)]
∂ h YA
∂T








Likewise, the ﬁrst-order condition for region B’s best tax rate is
γA(1−β)h YB +
+
[1 − γA(1 − β)(1 − tB)]
∂ h YB
∂T

























The pair (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium if the triplet (tA,t B,kn) is a solution to
(11), (15) and (16).
4.1 Nash Equilibrium with Symmetric Regions
Assume that the density function of the productivity factors is symmetric and
that the regions have equal labour supplies and equal ﬁrm ownership shares:
L =1
γA = γB =1 /2
The regions are identical and will choose the same tax rate. Every ﬁrm will
locate in the region in which its productivity factor is higher. The equilibrium




The last restriction implies that (11) can be removed from the three equation
system determining tA, tB and kn. Imposing all of the above restrictions, and










12A critical issue in tax competition is whether regions will tax proﬁts at all.
The fear of losing ﬁrms to other regions might drive the tax rates ever downward,
until each region is subsidizing proﬁts because the other region is subsidizing
proﬁts. Equation (17) oﬀers some insight into the conditions under which regions
subsidize and the conditions under which they tax. The tax is positive if the
expression in square brackets is greater than one, and it is negative – that is, it
is a subsidy – if the expression is less than unity. Equivalently,
sign[t]=sign[(1 − α) − 2αφB(1)]
Figure 3 shows the pairs (α,β) for which the equilibrium outcome involves taxes
and the pairs for which it involves subsidies. (The pairs below the diagonal line
have an unstable symmetric equilibrium, and hence have been excluded from
consideration.) Note that:
• The more important is agglomeration (that is, the greater is α), the less
likely the regions are to tax ﬁrms. Agglomeration increases the value of
having a ﬁrm locate in a region (through its external eﬀects on other ﬁrms),
and hence increases the cost of driving ﬁrms out of the region through high
taxes. Agglomeration can be removed from the model by simply setting α
equal to zero.
• The less the ﬁrms’ productivity factors vary across regions, the greater is
z 
B(1) and the less likely the regions are to tax. With minimal heterogeneity,
all ﬁrms will want to locate in B if k exceeds one by an arbitrarily small
amount, and all ﬁr m sw i l lw a n tt ol o c a t ei nA when k falls short of one by
an arbitrarily small amount. For this to be the case with zB continuous,
z 
B must approach inﬁnity in the neighbourhood of unity. In the limit as
z 
B(1) approaches inﬁnity, all of the ﬁrms will be virtually identical. It is
then almost certain that the regions will subsidize ﬁrms.
These results extend previous results in the literature. Burbidge, DePater,
Myers and Sengupta (1997) show, in a model with no agglomeration and no
heterogeneity, that regions that import capital will reduce the price of these
imports by taxing capital, while regions that export capital will raise the price of
the exported capital by subsidizing capital at home. In a symmetric equilibrium,
of course, no region is a net exporter or a net importer of capital, so that the
tax rate on capital is equal to zero. Burbidge and Cuﬀ (2003) generalize these
ﬁndings by introducing agglomeration into this model. They show that, when
homogeneous capital has a positive external eﬀect on the region’s output, each
region subsidizes capital in an attempt to gain the beneﬁt of the externality.
When capital is homogeneous z 
B(1) is inﬁnite, or equivalently, φB(1) is inﬁnite.
13Figure 3: The enclosed region consists of the pairs (α,β) for which the symmetric
equilibrium under ￿xed taxes is stable. This region is divided into two sections, one in
which the symmetric equilibrium involves taxes and one in which it involves subsidies. A
decrease in z0
B(1) shifts the dividing line to the right.
Figure 3 shows the pairs (α,β) for which the equilibrium outcome involves taxes and the
pairs for which it involves subsidies. (The pairs below the diagonal line have an unstable
symmetric equilibrium, and hence have been excluded from consideration.) Note that:
￿ The more important is agglomeration (that is, the greater is α), the less likely the
regions are to tax ￿rms. Agglomeration increases the value of having a ￿rm locate in
a region (through its external effects on other ￿rms), and hence increases the cost of
driving ￿rms out of the region through high taxes.
￿ The less the ￿rms￿ productivity factors vary across regions, the greater is z0
B(1) and
the less likely the regions are to tax. For example, if all of the ￿rms are virtually iden-
tical, allof the￿rmswillwanttobeinB ifk exceeds 1byanarbitrarilysmallamount,
and all of the ￿rms will want to be in A when k falls short of 1 by an arbitrarily small
amount. If zB is continuous, z0
B must approach in￿nity in the neighbourhood of 1. It
is then almost certain that the regions will subsidize the ￿rms.
14The dashed line in Figure 3 then shifts leftward until it passes through the origin,
eliminating the region in which capital is taxed. If α is equal to zero, capital is
neither taxed nor subsidized (as in Burbidge et al. (1997)); and if α is greater
than zero, capital is subsidized.
A novel feature of the current model is ﬁrm heterogeneity. In any equilibrium,
almost all of the ﬁrms are inframarginal; they earn rents in their preferred loca-
tions. The regions naturally have an incentive to tax these rents. The greater is
the degree of heterogeneity – the farther to the right is the dashed line in Figure
3 – the more likely the incentive to tax inframarginal ﬁrms dominates the incen-
tive to subsidize capital. Also, given the degree of heterogeneity of the ﬁrms, the
positive externality associated with capital becomes larger as α becomes larger,
and hence regions tax when α is small and subsidize when it is large.
In this model, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is eﬃcient because regions tax
proﬁts at the same rate.10 The allocation of ﬁr m si nt h ee c o n o m ym a x i m i z e st o t a l
output. There is no trade in the symmetric Nash equilibrium and all workers in
the economy are equally well-oﬀ. It is natural then to ask what happens when
regions are asymmetric.
4.2 Nash Equilibrium with Asymmetric Regions
If regions diﬀer in their labour endowment and shares of ﬁrm ownership, and the
frequency distribution of factor productivities is asymmetric, then the allocation
of ﬁrms in the Nash equilibrium may be ineﬃcient. The Nash equilibrium is
eﬃcient only if regions happen to choose the same proﬁtt a xr a t e .A n yi n e ﬃciency
arises solely because each regional government has an incentive to manipulate
the terms of trade and set diﬀerent tax rates. As a result, total output in the
economy, or equivalently, total resources available to the two regions, will not
b em a x i m i z e d . I ti sp o s s i b l et h e nt h a ts o m ef o r mo ft a xh a r m o n i z a t i o nm a y
achieve a Pareto improvement. We ﬁr s ti l l u s t r a t et h et e r m s - o f - t r a d ee ﬀect and
then characterize the Pareto-improving tax harmonization schemes.
4.2.1 Terms-of-Trade Eﬀect
Deﬁne the net payment in output to foreign owners of ﬁrms operating in region i
as the diﬀerence between the output of region i, and the total resources of region
i,11
Ii ≡ Yi − Ri (18)
If Ii > 0,t h e nr e g i o ni is a net ﬁrm importer; if Ii < 0, then region i is a net
ﬁrm exporter. Given that the total number of ﬁrms in the economy is ﬁxed,
the two regions are closed — if one is a capital exporter the other must be a
10The allocation of the mobile factor with symmetric regions will still be eﬃcient if workers
are not taxed. The provision of the government good, however, will be ineﬃciently low.
11Given the assumptions on workers’ preferences, all of the regional resources will be con-
sumed by the workers.
14capital importer. Firm importers have to make payments to foreign investors
and therefore have an incentive to tax ﬁrms to drive down the after-tax return
received by foreign owners. Firm exporters have an incentive to subsidize ﬁrms
to increase the payments they receive from the ﬁrms they own that are located
outside of the region. Each region has an incentive to manipulate the terms-of-
trade.
To illustrate this incentive, imagine that, beginning from the symmetric equi-
librium, a small quantity of labour and a small share of the ownership of ﬁrms is
transferred from region B to region A, so that region A becomes proportionately
larger than region B. The regional endowment ratio of labour to share of ﬁrm
ownership will be the same in each region. It is assumed for this exercise that the
frequency distribution of the θs remains symmetric. Normalizing the population
is to one, we assume
HA = x, γA = x, HB =1− x, γB =1− x
The comparative statics exercise then is to increase x marginally from an initial
value of 1/2 and to determine how net payments and per capita resources, which
measures workers’ welfare change, in each region. To highlight the diﬀerent forces
at work in the model, we consider three benchmark cases. They are:
• The standard model with no agglomeration eﬀects and minimal heterogene-
ity of ﬁrms.
• The agglomeration only model which retains agglomeration eﬀects but as-
sumes that the diﬀerences among ﬁrms are arbitrarily small.
• The heterogeneity only model which has no agglomeration eﬀects but per-
mits heterogeneity among ﬁrms.
Agglomeration can be removed from the model by simply setting α equal to
zero, but heterogeneity among ﬁrms cannot be completely eliminated. There
will be minimal heterogeneity if z 
B approaches inﬁnity in the neighbourhood of
unity.12
Table 1 shows the impact of a marginal increase in x, starting from the sym-
metric equilibrium, on the variables of in t e r e s ti ne a c ho ft h et h r e eb e n c h m a r k
models.13 The table focuses on region A, but the symmetry of the two regions
implies that the change in region B i st h es a m es i z ea st h ec h a n g ei nr e g i o nA but
of opposite sign. The comparative statics exercise is such that the proportional
increases in both region A’s labour supply and its share of ﬁrm ownership are
equal to 2.
12Equivalently, z3
A must approach negative inﬁnity at k =1 .
13The results presented in Table 1 are derived in the Appendix.
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Consider ﬁrst the standard model. In this model:
• If the ﬁrms were allocated eﬃciently, then the increase in A’s share of the
ﬁrms would be the same as the increase in A’s share of ownership. Neither
region would be a capital exporter or capital importer, and hence neither
would have an incentive to move its tax rate away from zero.
• If each region were to leave its tax rate unchanged, the taxes would not
distort the ﬁrms’ location decisions, and the equilibrium allocation of ﬁrms
would be the same as the eﬃcient allocation.
It follows that the equilibrium is characterized by unchanged tax rates, no net
capital exports or imports, and the eﬃcient allocation of ﬁrms. In the absence
of agglomeration, the regional production function displays constant returns to
scale, so A’s output rises by the same proportion as its population. Its resources,
RA, rise by the same rate, leaving per capita resources unchanged. Each person’s
welfare is a monotonic function of per capita resources, so welfare is unchanged
by the posited transfer of resources. The Nash equilibrium is always eﬃcient
when there are no agglomeration eﬀects and minimal ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Now consider the model in which there is agglomeration but minimal hetero-
geneity. At symmetry, both regions are subsidizing ﬁrms to correct properly for
the positive externality generated by capital. Capital imports are, of course, zero.
Once labour has been shifted from B to A,t h ee ﬃcient allocation of ﬁrms results
in a higher ﬁrm-to-labour ratio in A than in B. If there were no adjustment in tax
rates, the equilibrium adjustment would match the eﬃcient adjustment. Moving
towards the eﬃcient allocation of ﬁrms, however, makes A an e tﬁrm importer
and the government of region A, as a ﬁrm importer, has an incentive to restrict
imports to lower the price it has to pay for its imports. Thus, region A reduces
the rate at which it subsidizes ﬁrms. At the same time, the opposite is happening
in region B where the government is trying to stem the outﬂow of ﬁrms to region
16A by subsidizing ﬁrms at a higher rate. These tax adjustments moderate the
movement of ﬁrms, so that the number of ﬁrms actually transferred between the
r e g i o n si ss m a l l e rt h a nt h ee ﬃcient number. In other words, kn falls but by less
than it should for economic eﬃciency. Per capita resources (utility) go(es) up in
region A since the proportional increase in A’s resources is greater than 2.
Finally, consider the model in which ﬁrms are heterogeneous but there is no
agglomeration. Firm heterogeneity is like the opposite of agglomeration. At
symmetry, each regional government taxes the rents of the ﬁrms located in its
region. Once labour has been shifted from B to A,i ti se ﬃcient to increase the
number of ﬁrms in A by a proportion smaller than 2. If there were no adjustment
of tax rates (so that the taxes would not distort the ﬁrms’ location decisions),
the equilibrium increase in the number of ﬁrms in A would be the same as the
eﬃcient increase. But moving this number of ﬁrms makes A an e tﬁrm exporter
and B an e tﬁrm importer, causing A to reduce its tax rate and B to increase
its tax rate. These adjustments encourage ﬁrms to move into A,s ot h ea c t u a l
increase in the number of ﬁr m si sg r e a t e rt h a nt h ee ﬃcient increase. Thus, kn
falls but by more than it should for economic eﬃciency. Per capita resources in
region A go down since the proportional increase in region A’s resources is less
than 2.
Table 1 (last row) also illustrates that as we move away from symmetry when
there is no agglomeration and minimal heterogeneity regions are just as well oﬀ
in the Nash equilibrium as they are when they do not use proﬁts taxes, i.e., the
eﬃcient outcome.14 With either agglomeration or heterogeneity, the large region
will be worse oﬀ in the Nash equilibrium than in the eﬃcient outcome. The large
region ‘loses’ at tax competition. Both agglomeration and the heterogeneity of
ﬁrms create externalities from the location of ﬁrms. With agglomeration, ﬁrms
generate a positive externality (moving one more ﬁrm into a region increases
the output of each ﬁrm in the region) and with heterogeneity, ﬁrms generate a
negative externality (moving one more ﬁrm into a region reduces the rents earned
by those ﬁrms located in the region). At the same time, the regions’ incentive to
manipulate the terms-of-trade results in too many ﬁrms locating in the smaller
region when there is agglomeration only and too few ﬁrms locating in the smaller
region when there is heterogeneity only. Consequently, the smaller region beneﬁts
in each case from the ineﬃcient allocation of ﬁrms. The small region ‘wins’ at
tax competition. Clearly, this result also holds if there is both agglomeration and
heterogeneity. This exercise, however, stepped only slightly away from symmetry
14This is in contrast to the result of the basic tax competition model (BTCM) that small
regions (in terms of worker population) can be better oﬀ in the Nash equilibrium than in the
eﬃcient allocation. See Wilson (1991) and Bucovetsky (1991). Small regions would also win
at tax competition if there were more than 2 regions with equal endowment ratios competing
for ﬁrms in our model with no agglomeration and minimal heterogenity. See Peralta and van
Ypersele (2002).
17and kept the endowment ratios constant across the two regions. It’s easy to
imagine that even with equal endowment ratios region A could ‘win’ at the tax
competition game if it had suﬃcient monopsony power, i.e., owned most of both
factors. Likewise, region A could win if it owned more ﬁrms than region B but
had the same number of workers. Of course, with unequal endowment ratios one
has to decide how to determine a region’s ‘size’ before making any statements
about whether the large or small region wins at tax competition.15
T h ea b o v ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i ce x e r c i s es h o w e dt h a tw h e nt h e r ei sa g g l o m e r a -
tion, heterogeneous ﬁrms, and a symmetric distribution of ﬁrm productivities, a
marginal shift in regional endowments from region B to region A starting from
the symmetric equilibrium can result in either region becoming a ﬁrm importer
or ﬁrm exporter. The exercise also demonstrated that with equal endowment
ratios the importing region will have both a higher tax rate (or lower subsidy
rate) and a higher level of welfare than the exporting region. These results hold
more generally under any assumed distribution of the θs.
T h et e r m s - o f - t r a d ee ﬀect can be summarized as follows:
Rhvxow 1: If the economy is stable, then in any Nash equilibrium
sign[IA]=sign[tA − tB].
The net importer of ﬁrms in any Nash equilibrium will have a higher tax
rate regardless of the sign of the tax rate, i.e., if both regions are subsidizing
ﬁrms in the Nash equilibrium then the net importer of ﬁrms subsidizes ﬁrms at
a lower rate. This result holds for any distribution of regional endowments and
it follows from the region’s ﬁrst-order conditions and the (assumed) stability of
the economy.16 If endowment ratios happen to be the same in both regions then
the following two results will also hold in the general model.
Rhvxow 2: If regions have the same labour to share of ﬁrm ownership endow-
ment ratio, then the region importing (exporting) ﬁrms will have a higher (lower)
level of welfare in any Nash equilibrium.
Rhvxow 3: If regions have the same labour to share of ﬁrm ownership en-
dowment ratio, then the residents of the region with the higher tax rate have a
higher level of welfare in any Nash equilibrium.
By deﬁnition, to be an importer the region must be paying more to foreign
owners than it is receiving from its ownership share of ﬁrms located in the other
15In the tariﬀ literature, regional size is determined by a region’s endowment of the traded
good. ‘Large’ countries have more monopoly power and will win tariﬀ wars in the sense that
they will be better oﬀ in the Nash equilibrium than under free trade (Kennan and Riezman,
1990). Burbidge et al. (1997) derive a similiar result in the BTCM with head taxes — the region
with the greater endowment ratio of capital to labour will win at tax competition..
16See Appendix for all proofs.
18region.17 From Result 1, the importing region will have the higher tax rate.
Since proﬁts are a ﬁxed share of total output, it follows that the importing region
will also have higher per capita output if endowment ratios are the same. The
importing region will also have higher per capita resources. If endowment ratios
are not the same across regions, however, then residents of the importing region
may have lower welfare.
The Nash equilibrium is output-maximizing only if regions happen to choose
the same proﬁt tax rate. This will be the case if regions are symmetric but
it may also occur if regions are asymmetric.18 Ineﬃciencies arise in the Nash
equilibrium when regions diﬀer in their endowments and/or when the distribution
of ﬁrm productivities is asymmetric solely because each regional government has
an incentive to manipulate the terms of trade.
4.2.2 Role for Tax Harmonization
With any non-zero equilibrium tax diﬀerential, the allocation of ﬁrms in the
economy will be ineﬃcient. Total output in the economy can be increased by
reallocating ﬁrms across the two regions. This suggests that adopting a common
tax rate may be Pareto improving. We ﬁrst prove the following result.
Rhvxow 4: If the economy is stable, then starting from any Nash equilibrium
a marginal reduction in the tax rate diﬀerential makes both regions better oﬀ.
In any Nash equilibrium, each region is already doing the best it can given the
other region’s choice of tax rate. Therefore, a region’s resources are aﬀected only
by the marginal change in the other region’s tax rate. A small reduction in the
tax diﬀerential will increase total output in the economy (assuming stability) and
each region will be made better oﬀ. Thus, starting from any Nash equilibrium a
small change that moves the tax rates closer together is Pareto improving. What
happens when there are large changes in the regional tax rates towards a common
rate?
With a common tax rate, total output in the economy is maximized. The
allocation of ﬁrms which achieves this outcome is unique. Therefore, the resources
available to a given region will be linear in the common tax rate, i.e., output in
each region is uniquely determined. How the maximized total output is divided
between the two regions will depend on the common rate adopted (and on the
given distribution of endowments in the economy). The economy has a linear
utility possibility frontier (UPF) as shown in Figure 4. Any Nash equilibrium
with unequal tax rates will achieve a point below the UPF.
17To see this, substitute in the expressions for regional resources (13) and (14) into the
deﬁnition of net payments (18).
18With a symmetric distribution of the θs and constant endowment ratios as in the compar-







N:  Nash equilibrium. 
C:  Taxes are  harmonized at B's 
         Nash equilibrium tax rate.
D:  Taxes are harmonized at the
         Pareto-improving rate most 
         favourable to B.
E:  Taxes are harmonized at the
         Pareto-improving rate most 
         favourable to A.
F:  Taxes are  harmonized at A's 
         Nash equilibrium tax rate.
RB/HBNow, suppose one of the region’s equilibrium tax rate was chosen to be the
common rate. That region will no longer be making a best response to the tax
rate of the other region and therefore, the region will be made worse oﬀ.S i n c e
total output in the economy increases with the adoption of a common rate, the
other region must be strictly better oﬀ. Such a tax harmonization scheme is not
Pareto improving and we have the following result.19
Rhvxow 5: If tax rates are unequal in the Nash equilibrium, then there are
some tax harmonization schemes that are not Pareto improving.
It follows that there exists some common tax rate e t such that with the adoption
of this rate one region is just as well oﬀ as it is in the Nash equilibrium, i.e., its
total resources are the same. Since total output is higher with the common rate,
the other region must be strictly better oﬀ.T h i sr e g i o nw i l lh a v em o r er e s o u r c e s
under the common rate than in the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we have a
Pareto improvement. This argument can be made for either region and again
since resources are linear in the common tax rate we have Result 6.
Rhvxow 6: In any Nash equilibrium with a non-zero tax rate diﬀerential, there
exists some tax rates e tA and e tB, lying between the equilibrium tax rates tA and
tB, such that any harmonized tax rate between e tA and e tB is Pareto improving.
The set of Pareto-improving harmonized tax rates can be seen in Figure 4.
5 Relationship to Economic Geography Model
Tax competition has recently become a focus of research in the economic geog-
raphy literature.20 Baldwin and Krugman (2004) argue that the predictions of
the BTCM are inconsistent with their interpretation of recent European history.
In their model two regions, the core and the periphery, use capital tax rates to
compete for mobile capital. They focus on equilibria in which capital is fully
agglomerated in the core.21 They model the history of the European Union (EU)
as a gradual reduction over time in trade costs (tariﬀ barriers) between the core
and the periphery. In their model, agglomeration creates rents which can be
taxed. These agglomeration rents are maximized at intermediate levels of trade
19Unlike the BTCM surveyed in Wilson (1999), raising both tax rates can never be Pareto
improving. Increasing either tax rate above the maximum equilibrium rate will always make
one region worse oﬀ.
20For example, see Kind et al. (2000) and Ludema and Wooton (2000). Baldwin et al. (2003)
summarize the tax competition ﬁndings of these and other papers in the economic geography
literature.
21Borck and Pﬂüger (2004) focus on tax competition equilibria with partial agglomeration
of the mobile factor, i.e., most, but not all, of the mobile factor is located in the core region.
They show that a tax diﬀerential between the core and the periphery can also arise in such
equilibria.
20costs. When trade costs are high, trade is limited and agglomeration rents are
low. When trade costs are low, rents are also low since location becomes less im-
portant. Thus, their model predicts that the diﬀerence between the capital tax
rates of the core and of the periphery will be a bell-shaped function of trade costs.
They argue that their model is consistent with the capital tax rate data reported
in Devereux, Griﬃth, and Klemm (2002) who show that over time capital tax
rates amongst the original members of the EU (the core) have been quite stable
b u tt h et a xr a t e si ns o m ec o u n t r i e st h a tj o i n e dl a t e r( t h ep e r i p h e r y )h a v eb e e n
U-shaped over time. Closer inspection of Baldwin and Krugman’s model reveals
though that, in their model, the capital tax rate of the periphery is independent of
trade costs and it is the capital tax rate of the core that is a bell-shaped function
of trade costs. These tax patterns are inconsistent with the data in Devereux et
al (2002). In this respect, we believe our model could be used to provide an al-
ternative, and possibly more accurate, explanation of what happened during the
development of the European Union.22 Of course, to do this we would have to
construct the history of capital imports/exports between the core and periphery
during the formation of the European Union to generate a prediction about the
shape of the tax diﬀerential. As well, we would also have to determine whether
agglomeration forces or the distribution of ﬁrm productivities has changed over
time.
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) are also critical of the BTCM because the model
cannot explain why high tax countries are more capital (or ﬁrm) intensive than
low tax countries. In our model, there can be a positive correlation between the
tax rates and the utilization ratios of the mobile to the immobile factor. Our
model is also consistent with countries having the same population but diﬀerent
tax rates a possibility that is ruled out in the BTCM.23 Baldwin and Krugman
go beyond this latter point and say:
“... increasing the degree of openness, we would see the emergence
of the core-periphery outcome with the mobile factor ﬂowing from
south to north. Although a full analysis of this possibility would
require detailed dynamic reasoning, we conjecture that we would see
the high tax nation being an importer of capital. This contradicts the
BTCM prediction” (Baldwin and Krugman (2004), p.19).
This is exactly what our model (or its forerunner) predicts.
22They may be other explanations for the persistence of such tax diﬀerentials. For exam-
ple, in Wooders and Zissimos (2003) ﬁrms are also heterogeneous in that they have diﬀerent
technological requirements for levels of amenity provision. Competition for mobile ﬁrms brings
about excessive diﬀerentials in taxation and amenity provision.
23A similar prediction arises in Baldwin and Krugman (2004), see their Result 3. Of course,
these results come about simply because regions diﬀer along additional dimensions than in the
BTCM — heterogenity of ﬁrm productivities in our model, and sequential tax-setting behaviour
in Baldwin and Krugman’s model.
21There are, however, technical diﬀerences between our models. Baldwin and
Krugman’s results are derived from a ‘limit-taxing’ game in which the core sets its
tax rate followed by the periphery; our results follow from a simultaneous-move
Nash game.24 This diﬀerence in structure induces diﬀerent predictions regarding
the eﬀects of tax harmonization. We quote Result 4 in Baldwin and Krugman
(2004):
“Result 4: In contrast to the BTCM result, upward harmonization of
tax rates in the presence of capital mobility is not a Pareto improve-
ment. In fact harmonizing tax rates at any single level makes one or
both nations worse oﬀ.”
In our model, upward harmonization of tax rates is also never Pareto improv-
ing.25 Some common tax rate between the two diﬀerent Nash equilibrium tax
rates can, however, result in a Pareto improvement.
Obviously our model and Baldwin and Krugman’s model omit important
features of reality. To mention just two omissions in a long list, neither model pays
any attention to the mobility of labour (an important aspect in the development of
the European Union) and neither model explains why there can be diﬀerential tax
treatment of ﬁrms within a given region. Both models emphasize the importance
of agglomeration rents but our model also highlights the possibility of rents arising
from ﬁrm heterogeneity. In particular, our model suggests that tax policy may
be inﬂuenced by rents arising from the interactions between agglomeration and
ﬁrm heterogeneity.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The incorporation of both agglomeration and heterogeneity of capital/ﬁrms into
the BTCM with (head) taxes on immobile labour expands the set of facts that can
be explained by capital tax competition models. In particular, the limitations of
the BTCM without head taxes, so emphasized by Baldwin and Krugman (2004),
are eliminated. Among other things, we show that regions may subsidize or tax
the mobile factor, there may be a positive or negative correlation between regional
tax rates and the ratio of mobile to immobile factor utilized in the regions, and
the larger region (in terms of size of supply of immobile factor) may export or
import the mobile factor as well as have a higher or lower per capita income than
the smaller region. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that our generalization
24The possibility of lumpy investment, i.e., a region can attract all or none of the mobile
factor from the other region, gives rise to the possibility of non-existence of pure-strategy
equilibria. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move tax game does not exist
when there is full agglomeration (Baldwin et al., 2003) and generally does not exist when there
is only partial agglomeration (Borck and Pﬂüger, 2004).
25S e t t i n gat a xﬂoor below the lowest equilbrium tax rate (Result 5, Baldwin and Krugman
(2004)) would have no eﬀect in our model as regions act simultaneously.
22of the BTCM with head taxes does not fundamentally alter the character of this
model – now if a region is a capital/ﬁrm importer its tax rate must exceed the
other region’s tax rate – but the “tax” rates could be of either sign whereas in
the BTCM with head taxes, capital importers tax capital and capital exporters
subsidize capital.
Those familiar with the BTCM without head taxes may wish to know how our
results would change if each region’s only tax were a tax on capital or ﬁrms. Our
model shows that agglomeration gives regions an incentive to subsidize capital
and that heterogeneity of capital gives regions an incentive to tax capital. These
incentives would still exist in a BTCM without head taxes but the equilibrium
capital tax rates could never be negative. Thus, the under-provision result of the
BTCM without head taxes could be worsened or improved with the existence of
agglomeration and heterogeneity of capital depending on their relative strengths.
T h et e r m s - o f - t r a d ee ﬀect described above would also be present even if regions
were unable to tax immobile labour. Thus, our paper suggests that in the BTCM,
without head taxes but with agglomeration and heterogeneous capital, it is pos-
sible that the larger region would import capital from the smaller region, and
have a higher tax rate, and/or a lower level of utility.
23Appendix
Notation. Equation (11) implies that the equilibrium value of k with given
proﬁt taxes can be written as
k
n = e k(TL) (A1)
while section 3.4 demonstrates that the value of k that maximizes total output is
k
e = e k(L)
Thus, kn and ke coincide if and only if the regions set the same tax rate. Using


























Note write (8) as
Yi = ψi(k,Hi) i = A,B
Let the composites of these functions with (A1) be
YA = m(TL,HA) m1 < 0
YB = n(TL,HB) n1 > 0
The symmetry of the density function g implies that, for each H,
m(T,H)=n(1/T,H)
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implying















Tax Rate Changes. For simplicity, deﬁne the functions





γA =1− γB = x
HA =1− HB = x
Then a Nash equilibrium is a pair (tA,t B) such that
ρi(tA,t B,x,1 − x,x,1 − x)=0 i = A,B
















(1 − t)2 > 0
where t is the tax rate under the symmetric equilibrium.
Given that the economy is initially in a symmetric equilibrium, the eﬀects of
marginally increasing x (so that region A’s share of the available labour and the
ownership of ﬁrms both rise) are found by applying Cramer’s rule and exploiting




































1 − β − α
2φA
&
25The tax changes in the three cases follow immediately from this equation.
The Allocation of Firms. Assume again that x rises from 1/2, shifting

























































Output and Resources. In the neighbourhood of a symmetric equilibrium,


























The results for the three cases are obtained by imposed additional restrictions on
these equations. The model with agglomeration only is obtained by letting φA
approach −∞, and the model with heterogeneity only is obtained by setting α
equal to 0. The standard model employs both assumptions.
Table 2 shows the values taken by these, and other necessary derivatives, in
each of the three special cases.








Initial t 0 − α









γA 2 2 2
dtA
dx 0 α




























HA 0 2 α



















(β−α)(1−α) > 0 2
(1−β)2
(1−2φAβ)(1−2φA) > 0













Using the expression for ∂T/∂tA and multiplying (15) by (1 − tA) yields
γB(1−β)(1− tA)YA+
+
[1 − γB(1 − β)(1 − tA)]
∂YA
∂T










[1 − γA(1 − β)(1 − tB)]
∂YB
∂T






Region A’s net payment can be written as
IA ≡ YA − RA = γB(1 − β)(1− tA)YA − γA(1 − β)(1− tB)YB (A5)
































e − k] (A8)
Given stability, it follows from (A2) that k is increasing in tA and decreasing in
tB. Total output is maximized when tax rates are equal. Taken together,
sign[k
e − k]=sign[tB − tA] (A9)
Together, (A7) to (A9) yield Result 1.
Proof of Result 2. Suppose IA > 0. Then, dividing (A5) by HAHB and









































where the inequality follows from (A10), equal endowment ratios, and Result 1.
If instead IA < 0 the inequality sign of (A11) would be reversed.
P r o o fo fR e s u l t3 .Focus on Region A and note that starting from the Nash
equilibrium a change in tB will aﬀect only region A’s resources since region A has
already optimized with respect to tA for a given level of tB. Therefore, using (13)
the change in region A’s resources from a marginal change in the tax rate of the
other region is given by
dRA
dtB
=−(1 − β)γAYB +
+
[1 − γB(1 − β)(1 − tA)]
∂ h YA
∂T



















28where the second equality follows from (15). Assuming a stable equilibrium,
















Consider a change in the tax rates such that dtA = −dtB. Suppose region A is a
net importer so by Result 1, tA >t B and kn >k e. From Lemma 1, an increase
in k reduces total output. Since T is decreasing in tB and increasing in tA, a
decrease in tA will increase resources in each region. Suppose instead region A
is a net exporter, so tA <t B and kn <k e.N o w ,a ni n c r e a s ei nk increases total
output and thus, an increase in tA will increase resources in each region.
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